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REGRET THEORY-EXPLANATION, EVALUATION
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW
Grant B. Gelberg*
This Note discusses regret theory, which offers an alternative explanation of ra-
tional behavior in risky or uncertain situations. Unlike traditional law and
economics, which is based on expected utility theory, regret theory posits that indi-
viduals either rejoice or experience regret after making a decision, and that the
anticipation of these feelings influences choices ex ante. In recent years, studies
have shown the robustness of regret theory, particularly when individuals compare
action to inaction, in disparate feedback environments, and when decisional
agency is altered. These, and other factors, influence regret theory's impact on liti-
gant behavior, as well as on the law of contracts, insurance, and torts.
We are all familiar with the would've, could've, and should've
beens of life. Whether manifested in the pang of a poor decision
or the feeling of an opportunity lost, regret is perhaps one of the
most profound human emotions. The power of regret has at-
tracted researchers who have studied its impact on decision
making under risk or uncertainty.' These studies have spawned re-
gret theory, which provides an alternative to the rational choice
model of law and economics as a means of describing and predict-
ing behavior.2 Regret theory asserts two simple assumptions. First,
once a decision is made people evaluate the outcome and feel re-
gret if an alternative outcome would have led to a better result.
Alternatively, a person rejoices if a different outcome would have
made him worse off.3 Second, regret theory states that people will
Contributing Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 36. B.A.
2000, UCLA summa cum laude-,J.D. 2003 (expected), University of Michigan Law School. The
author wishes to express his thanks to James Krier and Ronen Avraham for their suggestions
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1. E.g., David Bell, Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 30 OPERATIONS RES.
961, 961 (1982); Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What,
When, and Why, 102 PSYCHOL. REv. 379, 379 (1995); Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden,
Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON.J. 805, 805
(1982); Marcel Zeelenberg et al., Consequences of Regret Aversion: Effects of Expected Feedback on
Risky Decision Making, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PROCESSES 148, 150 (1996) [hereinafter
Zeelenberg et al., Consequences];. The terms "risk" and "uncertainty" are often used inter-
changeably, but classical economics defines each in a slightly different manner. Under risk,
the probability of an outcome is not certain but is knowable, while uncertainty describes the
circumstance where the probabilities are not only indeterminate but also unknown to the
actor. Carol A. Heimer, Social Structure, Psychology, and the Estimation of Risk, 14 ANN. REV. Soc.
491,493 (1998).
2. Bell, supra note 1, at 979; Loomes & Sugden, supra note 1, at 820.
3. Loomes & Sugden, supra note 1, at 808.
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anticipate these ex post feelings and shift their preferences ex ante.
Regret theory enriches traditional law and economics and offers
important lessons for lawyers, judges and policy makers.
Any first year law student can attest to the dominance of law and
economics in legal education and scholarship. From property to
torts, law and economics has changed not only the course of study
for law students, but has altered the way we analyze and view the
American legal system. As a result, it surprises many people to
learn that the central tenets of law and economics have been un-
der attack since the 1950s. First economists, and later cognitive
psychologists, offered convincing critiques of rational choice the-
ory.6 These scholars attempted to explain the systematic failure of
rational choice theory to accurately describe or predict human de-
cision making under risk or uncertainty.' In the early 1980s, regret
theory entered this debate. Two British economists s Graham
Loomes and Robert Sugden, developed the theory independently
from David Bell, a Harvard-based economics scholar.9 While the
two studies contained some minor differences, both proposed re-
gret theory as an alternative to expected utility for evaluating
rational behavior.'0
Today, many legal scholars continue to search for lessons from
economics and the social sciences to further our understanding of
how the law reflects, and influences, human behavior. This Note
draws on the discipline of regret theory and analyzes the role the
theory plays in legal thought. Part I introduces traditional law and
economics and describes how cognitive psychology, in the form of
the behavioral law and economics movement, has critiqued the
standard law and economics model in a manner similar, as well as
different, from regret theory. Part II introduces regret theory and
4. Indeed many leading first year case books employ economics as an analytical tool
to aid in the study of the respective subject. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER,
PROPERTY 47 (4th ed. 1998).
5. Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL Eco-
NOMICS 587, 617-621 (John Kagel & Alvin Roth eds., Princeton University Press 1995).
6. Id. Expected utility theory states that when facing an uncertain choice, a rational
actor weighs the costs and benefits of each choice and selects the one that best furthers her
preferences. Expected utility is a critical element of economists' formulation of a rational
choice. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Ra-
tionality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1063 (2000); see also
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Eco-
nomics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 13, 13-14 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
7. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 6, at 1063.
8. Loomes & Sugden, supra note 1, at 805.
9. Bell, supra note 1, at 961.
10. Id.; Loomes & Sugden, supra note 1, at 822.
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discusses subsequent refinements to the theory. Part III examines
regret theory's legal implications and emphasizes regret theory's
relationship to contract formation, litigation behavior, tort and
insurance law. Part IV concludes by underscoring potential legal
reforms implicated by an enhanced understanding of regret
theory.
PART I-LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS:
THEORETICAL CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS
Economic analysis assumes that people are rational actors.
From this simple yet important premise, legal economists attempt
to describe human interactions and prescribe rules to influence
behavior. Supporters of law and economics assert that many legal
rules at the heart of the common law system have economic un-
derpinnings that promote rational behavior and efficiency.12 Thus,
in its prescriptive form, law and economics seeks to provide incen-
tives for people to behave in a manner that promotes efficiency.
For example, the economics of tort law forces tortfeasors to bear
the cost of their risky behavior, thereby deterring others from
committing similar tortious acts in the future. 3 Law and economics
counsels against over-deterring drivers, for example, which would
result in a decline in the activity, and encourages the crafting of
laws that reduce net costs to society.1
4
The importance of rationality to economic analysis inevitably
leads one to ask, what does it mean to be a rational actor? Law and
economics defines rationality via the axioms drawn from the writ-
ings of the Swiss economists von Neumann and Morgenstern" -
commensurability, transitivity, invariance, cancellation and domi-
nance. 6 A rational actor must comply with all five axioms, but
11. RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 4-5 (4th ed. 1992).
12. POSNER, supra note 11, at 23.
13. Id. at 24.
14. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 517-19 (1961).
15. Camerer, supra note 5, at 619.
16. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 6, at 1064. Initially, scholars extrapolated three
axioms from von Neumann and Morgenstern's work. For the purposes of this Note I list the
five detailed in the Korobkin and Ulen article, with a special emphasis on transitivity and
invariance. Transitivity and invariance are defined in the above text. The commensurability
axiom states that actors should be able to compare the utility of one choice with that of
another. Cancellation requires that an individual's choices not rest on identical features of
FALL 2002]
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transitivity and invariance are the most critical to define for the
purposes of this Note.17 The transitivity axiom states that if a person
prefers choice A to choice B, and choice B to choice C, she will
prefer choice A to choice C.'8 Economic analysis also assumes that
preferences are invariant. Thus, if I prefer choice A to choice B,
this preference should remain constant, no matter how the choice
is presented or framed in the future."" These assumptions of ra-
tionality are critical to the theory of law and economics because
legal economists craft incentive structures based on the belief that
people are rational actors, i.e., they do not violate the axioms of
expected utility.20 In contrast, regret theory maintains that while
people systematically violate the transitivity axiom, this behavior is
entirely rational because they are responding to the anticipation of
ex post regret.21
As early as the mid-1950s the French economist, Maurice Allais,
22published a critique of von Neumann and Morgenstern's axioms.
His famous "paradoxes" identified situations where actors system-
atically violated the assumptions of rationality and did not act as
expected utility maximizers.3 Throughout the ensuing decades,
scholars and researchers expanded Monsieur Allias' paradoxes
different options. Dominance states that an actor should never choose an option whose
features are as good as another option and where at least one feature is less good. The
Korobkin and Ulen paper also provides an excellent overview of the theoretical
underpinnings of law and economics, as well as a thoughtful evaluation of the relationship
between cognitive biases and economic theory.
17. The axioms that describe a rational actor in effect also illustrate a person who,
based on his preferences, is seeking to maximize utility. See id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. However, scholars still debate the precise definition of a rational actor. "A person
might be deemed rational if her behavior (1) conforms to the axioms of expected utility
theory; (2) is responsive to incentives, that is, if the actor changes her behavior when the
costs and benefits are altered; (3) is internally consistent; (4) promotes her own welfare; or
(5) is effective in achieving her goals, whatever the relationship between these goals and her
actual welfare." Jolls et al., supra note 6, at 20. The authors note research that has demon-
strated individuals violate each of these definitions.
21. Classical regret theory retained the invariance axiom from expected utility theory,
but subsequent studies have demonstrated that the presentation of a choice can impact the
level of anticipated regret and thus alter the predictions of the theory. Loomes & Sugden,
supra note 1, at 808. The findings of the studies on invariance and regret are discussed in
Part II of this Note.
22. Maurice Allais, Le Comportment de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Pos-
tulates et Axiomes de lEcole Americaine, 21 ECONOMETRICA 503, 546 (1953); see Camerer, supra
note 5, at 622.
23. Camerer, supra note 5, at 623.
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into a generalized critique of rational choice theory, while simulta-
neously developing competing theories of human behavior.4
In the late 1970s, cognitive psychologists began to challenge the
assumptions of expected utility theory. These studies indicated that
preferences are often intransitive and variant-that, for example,
simply phrasing the choice in a different manner may alter an in-
dividual's selection and that sometimes an individual's preference
may be: A > B > C, but A < C.2 5 Most prominently, two Israeli psy-
chologists, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, developed
prospect theory as an alternative to expected utility theory.26 Rely-
ing on empirical data, prospect theory boldly countered expected
utility theory's central assumptions. First, it stated that people
evaluate choices as either losses or gains from a fixed point. Sec-
ond, it stated that while actors are risk averse to gains they are risk
seeking to losses.2 7 Kahneman and Tversky's work lays the founda-
tion and provides support for one of the principal corollaries of
regret theory-that the fear of regret (a loss) looms larger than the
anticipation of the gains associated with rejoicing.
24. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99
(1955).
25. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 269 (1979). In 2002, Daniel Kahneman won one-half of the
Nobel Prize in Economics "for having integrated insights from psychological research into
economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under un-
certainty." Nobel Foundation, The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory
of Alfred Nobel 2002 at http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2002/index.html (last
modified Oct. 9, 2002). Daniel Kahneman's long time research partner, Amos Tversky, died
of cancer in 1996 at the age of 59. The Nobel committee does not award Prizes posthu-
mously. For a brief biography of Amos Tversky, see Senate of the Academic Council, Stanford
University, Memorial Resolution: Amos Tversky (1937-1996), http://www.stanford.edu/
dept/facultysenate/archive/19971998/reports/105949/106013.html (last visited Nov. 23,
2003) (on file with the Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
26. Id. at 268. Prospect theory maintains that people are risk averse to gains. As a re-
sult, people will choose a sure gain of $90 over the chance to flip a coin for $200 (or $0).
The sure $90 is chosen even though flipping the coin has an expected utility of $100. Con-
versely, people are risk seeking to losses. They prefer the riskier choice to the sure loss.
Prospect theory predicts that a person choosing between a sure loss of $90 and the chance
to flip for a loss of $200 (or $0) will choose to flip. This risk preference demonstrates that
losses loom larger than gains. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and
Frames, 39 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 343 (1984) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Choices].
Kahneman and Tversky's study also shows that the presentation of a choice affects decisions.
Choices merely framed as a loss induced risk-seeking behavior, while decisions couched as
gains promoted risk aversion. While not initially predicted for regret theory, scholars have
identified powerful framing effects that can manipulate the anticipation of ex post regret.
Understanding how regret theory builds on the foundations laid by both economics and
cognitive psychology increases its descriptive power as well as its relevance to the law.
27. Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 26, at 343.
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Inspired by the observations of cognitive psychology, a number
of legal scholars-now dubbed the behavioral law and economics
movement-have applied elements of prospect theory to the law in
an effort to refine the traditional law and economics model of
decision making.8 In addition to the risk preferences identified by
prospect theory, behavioral law and economics has focused its
attention on a series of cognitive biases and decision-making
heuristics. These heuristics, or rules of thumb, are mental shortcuts
that people use to process information and make decisions under
uncertainty.29 Heuristics often help us make decisions quickly and
efficiently, but on other occasions they may lead to systematic
errors in decision making.3° For example, certain biases cause
individuals to systematically overestimate small probabilities, and
underestimate high probability events, while others predict a
strong preference for the status quo.3 1 These biases, in conjunction
with prospect theory, form the foundation for the behavioral
critique of traditional law and economics. As described in the
following sections, regret theory shares some characteristics with
the behavioral school while offering its own powerful critique of
law and economics.
PART I1-INTRODUCING THE THEORY
Like behavioral law and economics, regret theory offers an al-
ternative to the traditional expected utility model of decision
making. 2 Regret theory, however, offers a different critique from
an analysis of cognitive biases. Regret theory is an alternative
means of describing rational behavior. As described above, regret
theory rests on two simple assertions. First, once a decision is made
people evaluate the outcome and feel regret if an alternative out-
come would have led to a better result. Alternatively, a person
28. Jolls et al., supra note 6, at 13-14; see, e.g.,JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the
Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 113, 117 (1996).
29. Jolls et al., supra note 6, at 15.
30. Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAw & ECONOMIcS 4, 5 (Cass R. Sun-
stein ed., 2000). For example, the availability heuristic tends to cause individuals "to think
that risks are more serious when an incident is readily called to mind or 'available.'" Id.
Often this mental short cut will help people avoid dangerous activities, but it may also lead
to inaccurate assessment of risk. In his article, Professor Sunstein offers a comprehensive list
of cognitive biases and heuristics while also explaining their application to the law.
31. Id. While this Note is related to behavioralism, regret theory is not a cognitive bias.
For that reason I will only discuss those biases that directly impact regret theory.
32. See Bell, supra note 1, at 962.
[VOL. 36:1
Regret Theoiy
rejoices if a different outcome would have made him worse off.33
Second, regret theory states that people will anticipate these ex post
feelings and shift their preferences ex ante.34 Additional studies
have indicated that regret aversion exists because, like losses versus
gains, regret looms larger than rejoicing.3
Regret theory thus differs from expected utility in an important
respect. Expected utility assumes that the value of separate out-
comes will be calculated independently. Regret theory posits "that
the value of a given option is a function not only of its own out-
comes but also of how its outcomes compare to the outcomes of
possible alternatives."36 Choices examined under regret theory are
not independent at all, but rather are determined in relationship
to one another. Given uncertainty, this results in a calculation of
"modified utility" by the decision maker. Modified utility represents
expected utility, plus or minus the anticipation of regret or rejoic-
ing. Regret represents a premium that must be overcome to reach
a decision consistent with expected utility theory.38
A. Action v. Inaction
Based on the initial findings of regret theory researchers sought
to investigate regret's relationship to action and inaction. Interest-
ingly, the majority of studies have found that action is regretted
more often than inaction.39 Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated
this hypothesis with their famous investor problem. In the prob-
lem, experimental subjects were told about two investors, Mr. Paul
and Mr. George. Mr. Paul owned stock in Company A. The subjects
were informed that he considered switching to Company B, but
33. Loomes & Sugden, supra note 1, at 808.
34. See Marcel Zeelenberg & Jane Beattie, Consequences of Regret Aversion 2: Additional
Evidence for Effects of Feedback on Decision Making, 72 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROC-
ESSES 63, 71 (1997).
35. Richard P. Larrick & Terry L. Boles, Avoiding Regret in Decisions with Feedback: A Nego-
tiation Example, 63 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 87,91 (1995).
36. Id. at 87 n.1.
37. See Loomes & Sugden, supra note 1, at 808. But see Lisa D. Ordonez & Terry Con-
nolly, Regret and Responsibility: A Reply to Zeelenberg et al., 81 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 132, 140 (2000).
38. See Bell, supra note 1, at 961.
39. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, inJUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 201 (Kahnman & Tversky eds., 1982) [hereinafter
Kahneman & Tversky, Simulation]; Marcel Zeelenberg et al., Reconsidering the Relation Between
Regret and Responsibility, 74 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 254, 267 (1998).
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elected not to do so. He later learned that he would have gained
$1200 had he made the switch. Mr. George owned stock in Com-
pany B and he did switch to Company A. As a result he lost $1200
because he sold B and bought A. Over 90% of the subjects re-
sponded that Mr. George would feel more regret.
The distinction between action and inaction highlights the im-
portance of the status quo to regret theory.4' People may be
reluctant to depart from the status quo due to regret aversion asso-
ciated with actions. Combined with the knowledge that regret
looms larger than rejoicing, regret associated with action may give
rise to a substantial premium.2 An individual must overcome this
premium in order to deviate from the status quo. As discussed in
Part III, an awareness of regret's relationship to the status quo can
aid policy makers in a variety of legal disciplines, particularly in
establishing the appropriate level of care in tort and insurance law.
B. Relevance of Decision Agency
Research indicates that the amount of regret people anticipate
varies depending on who makes the decision. Several recent studies
have demonstrated that subjects feel more regret when they make
a decision for themselves than when the choice is made by another
or occurs randomly.43 A simple experiment with three scenarios
illustrates this result.44 In the first, a college student switches lec-
tures and subsequently received a poor grade. A second student
also switches lectures and received a poor mark, but his exchange
is mandated by the university computer and was entirely random.
The third student does not change lectures and also receives a low
score. Ordonez and Connolly found that the subjects produced
responses indicating that the student who made the decision her-
40. Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power
of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1613 (1998) (citing Kahneman &
Tversky, Simulation, supra note 39).
41. Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, in BE-
HAVIORAL LAw & ECONOMICS 116, 133 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) [hereinafter Korobkin,
Behavioral Economics].
42. Larrick & Boles, supra note 35, at 95. In the context of a negotiation problem, sub-
jects demonstrated a regret premium of 10%. This figure represents the amount of money
the subjects were willing to forego to avoid learning the result of an alternative choice,
thereby shielding them from the possibility of regret.
43. Zeelenberg et al., Consequences, supra note 1, at 268; Ordonez & Connolly, supra
note 37, at 140.
44. Ordonez & Connolly, supra note 37, at 136.
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self felt more regret than the random assignee or the student who
did not change classes."
This finding illustrates the relevance of decision agency to regret
theory. The greater one's decisional responsibility, the more regret
one may anticipate. The relationship between action and deci-
sional agency can also have important implications for policy
makers trying to encourage certain behavior. As discussed in Part
III, insurance may act as a means of delegating responsibility for a
choice by shifting responsibility for the choice to others, thus al-
lowing people to move off the status quo. An individual still
anticipates regret via delegation, but to a lesser degree as com-
pared to making the decision for herself.
46
Other studies reveal that the level of anticipated regret may vary
amongst individuals.47 People with lower self-esteem may experi-
ence heightened levels of anticipated regret.48 This leads to greater
regret aversion, which translates into an increased status quo bias.
If correct, this finding appears to impact the prescriptive value of
regret theory. If people do not view regret in the same manner, it is
difficult to make accurate and society-wide predictions about be-
havior.49
However, this is true of all the biases identified by cognitive psy-
chology. People are systematically overconfident, but the amount
of over-optimism varies with the individual .50 This does not mean
we cannot make predictions about behavior. Cognitive biases, as
well as the rational actor model, present a generalized view of hu-
man decision making that may or may not be true on the
individual level. The same is true of regret theory. Additionally, it is
helpful to identify portions of the populace who perceive greater
or lesser regret and to design rules that reflect these differences.
For example, it appears logical that NASCAR drivers perceive re-
gret (and thus risk) in an entirely different manner from patients
45. Id. at 139.
46. Id.
47. Robert A. Josephs et al., Protecting the Self From the Negative Consequences of Risky Deci-
sions, 62J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 26, 33 (1992).
48. Id. at 33.
49. See David W. Harless, Actions versus Prospects: The Effect of Problem Representation on Re-
gret, 82 AM. ECON. Rav. 634, 646 (1992).
50. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 6, at 1087; Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories
of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Overview, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1499, 1520 (1998).
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suffering from clinical depression. Awareness of these differences
can lead to more nuanced and effective policy making.
C. The Role of Feedback
Perhaps the most significant advance in our understanding of
regret theory has come from examining the role of feedback in the
decision-making process. Simply put, the anticipation of feedback
can manipulate the level of regret and risk aversion in individuals.
Larrick and Boles demonstrated this effect by describing choices
associated with a coin toss. 53 Two choices were presented. Choice A
represented a guaranteed $90 with no flip of the coin. Choice B
offered the chance to flip a coin for $200 (or $0). Choice A offered
a certain payoff of $90 (for just showing up) while choice B re-
quired guessing correctly on the coin flip, but offered a higher
expected reward of $100. 54 More people selected A than predicted
by expected utility when they were told that the coin would be
flipped only if they selected option B.5' Picking the sure thing
shielded the subject from receiving the possible negative feedback
from the flip. In this instance, the road to less regret ran by way of
56risk aversion. Additionally, because regret looms larger than re-
joicing, regret aversion trumps any rejoicing the subject might feel
from discovering he would have lost had the coin been tossed .
51. Zeelenberg et al., Consequences, supra note 1, at 156; Zeelenberg & Beattie, supra
note 34, at 71. Zeelenberg's study found increased regret avoidance amongst individuals
who recently experienced regret. This heightened regret premium manifested itself in both
increased risk aversion and risk seeking, depending on feedback, for decisions associated
with the ultimatum game. See also Kenneth Savitsky et al., Remembering and Regretting: The
7egarnik Effect and the Cognitive Availability of Regrettable Actions and Inactions, 23 PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 248, 248 (1997).
52. Savitsky et al., supra note 51.
53. Larrick & Boles, supra note 35, at 88.
54. Calculating the expected value of choice A is a straightforward multiplication of
$90 and 1, which is the probability that the event will occur. B's expected value is calculated
by multiplying the possible payoff ($200) by the probability the correct side of the coin is
chosen (.5).
55. Larrick & Boles, supra note 35, at 88.
56. Id. The results demonstrate risk aversion because the majority of participants chose
the certain $90 benefit over the opportunity to flip for $200 with its accompanying higher
expected value of $100. In an experiment involving feedback and negotiation subjects dem-
onstrated a similar regret premium of 10%, which reflected the amount of wealth the
people were willing to forego to avoid the possibility of regret.
57. Id.
RTgd Theory
In a second scenario, people were told that the coin would be
flipped even if they chose the sure $90 of choice A. As a result,
50% of the time subjects would learn they were worse off than if
they had selected B. Under this scenario, risk aversion may lead to
ex post regret. As a result, the subjects demonstrated increased risk
neutrality and exhibited a lower preference for the sure thing.
Larrick and Boles understood the difference in the "degree of risk
aversion in these two feedback environments as a measure of re-
gret aversion." 59
Larrick and Boles demonstrated that manipulating the level of
expected ex post feedback changes the ex ante anticipation of regret,
which in turn impacts the risk calculus. This finding represents a
potentially significant refinement of regret theory and indicates
several uses for policy makers and legal scholars. By controlling the
flow of information in a manner to highlight certain outcomes
over others, courts and bureaucracies can alter the risk assessment
of individuals.6 0 This point is more fully understood when regret
theory is evaluated in conjunction with some of the biases and
heuristics discussed in the literature of cognitive psychology.6'
D. Regret Theory and Cognitive Biases
The supporters of regret theory offer it as an alternative to ex-
pected utility and the rational actor model. This assertion begs the
58. Id.
59. Id. Larrick and Boles' study is related to business negotiations. They found that
when coming to an agreement shielding parties from feedback the parties were much more
willing to agree than when feedback was equally likely from agreeing or disagreeing on a
particular element of a business deal. The coin flip is an extrapolation of this negotiation
model. Larrick and Boles determined that the subjects in the negotiation study required a
regret premium of 10% to reach a decision consistent with expected utility. How generalized
this figure is in other circumstances is unclear. It is conceivable that the regret premium may
fluctuate in varying degrees between individuals, circumstances and probabilities.
60. The Larrick and Boles study demonstrated how regret aversion might lead to risk-
averse selections. Zeelenberg and Beattie have shown that manipulating the level of ex-
pected feedback tends to make subjects regret minimizers rather than risk minimizers.
Subjects select relatively higher risk gambles when the amount of expected feedback indi-
cates that choice would lead to less regret. The authors indicated that risk aversion and
regret aversion converge when one of the choices offered is a certain payoff. However, in life
few decisions represent a choice between a sure thing and a gamble, but rather between two
gambles with different probabilities. Under these conditions, a majority of subjects would
select the relatively riskier choice if they believed they would later learn the outcome. These
studies demonstrate this result for both gains and losses. Zeelenberg & Beattie, supra note
34, at 76.
61. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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question: do the biases identified by cognitive psychology also im-
pact regret theory? The simple answer is a fairly emphatic "yes."
Which biases, and to what degree, present the more interesting
questions for legal scholars and policy makers.
"Classical" regret theory explains violations of transitivity, but re-
tains the invariance axiom from expected utility.62 Preferences
modified by regret theory should not depend on how the choice is
presented or structured, i.e., regret theory should not be vulner-
able to the framing effect described by Kahneman and Tversky.63
Recent studies appear to refute this assertion. Several experiments
indicate that regret theory is actually highly context dependent.64
The ability of subjects to compare alternative outcomes plays a par-
ticularly significant role in shaping the influence of regret in
decision making.5
By altering the presentation of information, David Harless
successfully manipulated regret effects involving lotteries. He found
regret increased the more the problem's framing encouraged
subjects to juxtapose both choices and outcomes."6 Regret effects
significantly declined when the context made it difficult for subjects
to make such comparisons. Harless stated that these results
"suggest[ ] a more severe limitation on the scope of regret
theory."
67
The results of his study appear to bolster Harless' assessment of
the probable scope of regret theory. If framing dramatically alters
the effects predicted by the theory, regret may also be vulnerable to
a host of other cognitive biases.6" There has been little research in
this area, but anecdotal observations appear to support the notion
that biases, such as anchoring and availability, may impact the pre-
dictions of regret theory.
The anchoring bias suggests that people make judgments based
on an initial value, or anchor level. The arbitrariness of this value
62. Loomes & Sugden, supra note 1, at 810.
63. Kahneman & Tversky, Simulation, supra note 39, at 289.
64. Harless, supra note 49, at 646; Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, Probability and Jux-
taposition Effects: An Experimental Investigation of the Common Ratio Effect, 2 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 159, 175 (1989).
65. Starmer & Sugden, supra note 64, at 171.
66. Harless, supra note 49, at 647.
67. Id. at 646. I have some reservations about Harless' study. After completing his
problems myself I found the presentation a bit confusing. The enhanced regret effects he
found with greater ease ofjuxtaposition may have resulted from clearer descriptions. While
this is an example of a problem's presentation affecting subsequent choices it is not the
framing effect identified by Kahneman and Tversky. Framing occurs because actors perceive
losses and gains differently, not out of confusion over a choice's actual meaning.
68. Id. at 643.
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leads to malassessments of probabilities. 9 The importance of the
status quo in regret theory indicates that anchoring might play a
critical role in determining the fixture of the initial value. Because
action is regretted more than inaction, people must overcome a
regret premium to move off the status quo. If anchoring estab-
lishes the status quo in an arbitrary manner, it can distort a
person's perception of the outcomes and probabilities she faces.
In addition, the availability bias may alter the level of anticipated
regret.70 The recent terrorist attacks offer an anecdotal example. A
family friend wanted her brother to come home from college over
the 2001 Thanksgiving holiday. She initially offered to pay for his
plane ticket, but because of her fears about the safety of flying after
September 11, 2001, she instead instructed him to rent a car in or-
der to make the drive from Palo Alto to Los Angeles. When asked
why she changed her mind, she explained that she would not have
been able to live with herself had anything happened to her
brother's flight. While not dispositive by any means, this example
illustrates that the woman's level of anticipated regret associated
with flying was altered by the events of September 11, 2001. Com-
paring two choices, she opted for her brother to take the more
dangerous option." Even after the terrorist attacks, it is statistically
safer to fly rather than drive on America's highways.
It is possible that prospect theory explains this choice as well.
Kahneman and Tversky observed that people systematically overes-
timate small probabilities while underestimating high probabilities.72
A person overestimating the risk of flying while discounting the
chance of dying in a car accident illustrates this bias. However, regret
theory may better explain the outcome. It is possible that her regret
premium associated with flying, amplified by the availability bias,
altered her risk assessment and her ultimate decision.
The interaction between regret theory and the cognitive biases
described above does call into question the theory's viability as a
69. Sunstein, supra note 30, at 5.
70. Id. Also called salience, the availability bias describes how "people tend to think
that risks are more serious when an incident is readily called to mind or available." Availabil-
ity is heightened by news reports or events from an individual's own life. Thi skews risk
assessments and causes people to believe that the risk of dying in a plane crash (a relatively
lower risk) is greater than dying in a car accident.
71. The chances of dying in a car accident are about I in 18,752, while the risk of per-
ishing in a plane crash is roughly 1 in 381,566. National Safety Council, What Are the Odds of
Dying? (October 3, 2002), at http://www.nsc.org/Irs/statinfo/odds.htm (last visited Nov. 23,
2002) (on file with the Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
72. Sunstein, supra note 30, at 4. The overestimation of smaller risks and the underes-
timation of greater risks is a central tenet of prospect theory.
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replacement for expected utility. However, regret theory was not
modeled as a replacement for expected utility, but as an alternative
expression of rational choice. 3 Indeed, regret is a theory of
modified utility-the expected utility of a choice, plus or minus
anticipated regret or rejoicing. Additional research is required
to achieve a better understanding of the interplay between
cognitive biases and regret theory. Yet, acknowledging that context
matters-that regret effects can be altered based on the ease of
juxtaposition, the availability of the risk, and the presence of an
anchoring value-has varied and powerful implications for the
legal world.
PART 111-IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW
While some scholars have questioned the reach of regret theory,
this Note has shown that several studies have enhanced its value as
a theory of decision making under risk and uncertainty, by consid-
ering the function of the status quo, agency and feedback.
7 4
However, subsequent studies have added to "classical" regret the-
ory and enhanced its value as a theory of decision making under
risk and uncertainty by considering the function of the status quo,
agency and feedback. A wide variety of disciplines have utilized
these findings and employed them to advocate changes in social
policy. From improving driving behavior, to promoting safe sex
amongst teenagers, students of regret theory have demonstrated a
high level of achievement in using the theory to describe and in-
fluence decisions. 5 This same success may be replicated in the
legal world. In the last several years, various scholars have begun to
explore regret's relationship to contract formation76 and the set-
tlement behavior of litigants. 77 The following section also explores
the relationship between regret theory and insurance and consid-
ers the problem of AIDs to highlight the manner in which regret
theory applies to risks associated with bilateral interactions.
73. Loomes & Sugden, supra note 1, at 822.
74. See, e.g., Harless, supra note 49, at 647.
75. Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior,
1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 43, 7 1;Joop van der Pligt & Rene Richard, Changing Adolescents' Sexual
Behavior: Perceived Risk, Self-Efficacy and Anticipated Regret, 23 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING
187, 192 (1993).
76. Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, supra note 41, at 116.
77. Guthrie, supra note 75, at 72.
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A. Contracts
The role of regret in contracts is similar to its involvement in the
coin flip problem discussed in Part II. In that study, participants
were more likely to choose the sure $90 when they were told they
would not learn the outcome of the coin flip, thus avoiding the
prospect of learning that the toss would have netted them $100.
When parties negotiate a contract they often face the choice of ap-
plying standard language or bargaining for specific terms.
Employing standard language is analogous to the less risky choice
of not flipping the coin because the outcomes produced by the use
of boilerplate contract language are far more certain than when
the parties insert bargained for provisions. Regret theory predicts
that for the parties to select the bargained-for terms they must
overcome the premium associated with the dickered clauses.'8
Standard terms, while not a sure thing, are far more certain than
the possibilities related to applying shaped language. As a result, if
the negotiator agrees to contract around the default language she
may demand a premium to overcome her anticipated regret. 79 This
premium is enhanced because bargaining for terms is an action
that departs from the status quo. Thus, parties that seek to replace
standard terms with bargained-for provisions must provide addi-
tional compensation to overcome the adverse party's regret
premium, which increases with negotiation. s°
Divergent feedback environments also explain the preference
for standard terms."' If a party agrees to the standard language it is
unlikely that he will ever discover how he would have faired under
the negotiated terms, but he will have a good sense of the legal and
business implications of applying boilerplate language. 8 In this
feedback environment, where one choice is far more certain than
the other, regret theory predicts that an actor will choose the
certain choice if that selection better shields him from the
prospect of facing ex post regret.82 Research on the subject supports
78. Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, supra note 41, at 130.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 134-35.
81. Zeelenberg et al., Consequences, supra note 1, at 156.
82. Due to the number of variables at play in even the most routine contracts, it is dif-
ficult for an actor to state with any certainty how the final content of the bargained-for terms
influenced the outcome as well as how the ex-post circumstances were altered by the boiler-
plate clauses.
83. Zeelenberg et al., Consequences, supra note 1, at 150. Some choices in life do not
come with the possibility of shielding one's self from ex post regret. Whether betting on a
FALL 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
this contention.84 Thus, the feedback environment created in the
context of bilateral contract negotiations provides parties with an
incentive to choose the certainty of the status quo. By selecting
default rules the actor limits the possibility he will learn the
outcome of the forgone alternative ex post, thus anticipating the
lower regret associated with the status quo.
These assertions provide important lessons for policy makers.
First, they underscore the importance of default rules. The
unwillingness of parties to contract out of default rules because of
regret aversion places a premium on crafting efficient baseline
regulations.85 Second, regret theory asserts a contrary position to
86traditional law and economics in the area of contract formation.
Assuming low transaction costs and symmetric information, law
and economics maintains that parties achieve the most efficient
outcome by selecting a standard term in lieu of bargaining."7
Regret theory suggests that the most efficient outcome may not be
achieved because a portion of the surplus was consumed by
anticipated regret, which made acting more costly than standing
pat. Further, if parties do bargain for a specific term, it may have a
greater value than predicted by law and economics because
expected utility fails to calculate the regret premium the parties
pay to depart from the standard language. s
B. Litigation Behavior
Regret theory also provides a unique lens for investigating the
settlement behavior of litigants. Again, the coin flip is a useful
analogy. Regret theory asserts that plaintiffs may be more likely to
accept the certainty of a settlement over the uncertainty of trial,
even where the expected outcome of ajudgment is higher than the
settlement offer.89 The role of feedback is critical. Settlement offers
sports team or choosing between two stocks, it will be possible for the individual to learn the
outcome of the foregone alternative. In these environments, feedback does not play a major
role in altering an actor's level of anticipated regret.
84. See Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, supra note 41, at 131.
85. See id. at 137.
86. Id.
87. Id. Accordingly, law and economics argues that courts should respect these stan-
dard terms because enforcing the parties' choice promotes efficiency.
88. Id. at 139.
89. See Guthrie, supra note 75, at 77-78. The difference between the plaintiff's settle-
ment offer and a higher verdict thus falls within the litigant's regret premium. In order to
go to trial a plaintiff must believe the expected value of a jury verdict is greater than the
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the prospect of avoiding the feedback of a trial, just as selecting the
certain outcome ensures no flip of the coin.90 This prediction
stands in stark contrast to the dominant models of litigation: the
economic model of suit and settlement and the framing theory of
litigation.9
Expected utility theory states that litigants weigh the costs and
benefits of settling versus litigating and select the option that offers
the highest anticipated return.92 Settlement fails to occur only
when either party overestimates his chances for success at trial. The
framing theory is distinct from the law and economics model.
Modeled on prospect theory, the framing model predicts that
plaintiffs are risk averse and are more apt to settle because they
view litigation as a gain, whereas defendants perceive suits as a loss
and are more likely to pursue the riskier choice of going to trial9
Compare these hypotheses with the outcome of a study that
tested the predictions of regret theory by placing hypothetical
defendant's final settlement offer plus the regret premium associated with the failure to
settle.
90. See Larrick & Boles, supra note 35, at 88, and accompanying text.
91. See Guthrie, supra note 75, at 54. The law and economics theory of suit and settle-
ment posits that, "litigants compare the value of settlement to the expected value of trial and
select whichever of the options promises more value." Id. at 47. Because pursuing a civil suit
to trial often costs more than settling, the economic model predicts that most suits will settle
out of court. See also Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Dis-
putes and Their Resolution, 27J. EcON. LITERATURE 1067 (1989); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D.
Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90
MICH. L. REv. 319, 324 (1991). The framing theory, modeled on prospect theory, asserts
that litigants evaluate their position from a fixed point. From this position, litigants are risk
averse to choices framed as gains and risk seeking to prospects presented as losses. The the-
ory maintains that plaintiffs view suits as a gain and are generally risk averse, whereas
defendants perceive litigation as a loss and exhibit risk-seeking behavior when deciding
whether to settle or proceed to trial.
92. Guthrie, supra note 75, at 54; see also Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 120. This theory
of suit and settlement is intended to address all costs and benefits, including attorney's fees
and punitive damages.
93. See Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 128. Jeffrey Rachlinski principally developed this
model in his work on litigation behavior. While incorporating some experimental evidence,
the paper is most noted for its review of the decisions made by actual litigants. In his article,
Rachlinski evaluated 722 civil cases in the California counties of San Francisco, San Mateo
and Santa Clara between 1981 and 1988. Rachlinski contends that results of this survey indi-
cate that plaintiffs view the proceeds of litigation as a gain. As a result, plaintiffs were more
likely to settle. Defendants, framing litigation as a loss, demonstrated risk-seeking behavior
and thus offered lower settlement figures because they were content to go to trial. This Note
argues that Rachlinski's data is also consistent with the predictions of regret theory. See also
Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman,& Matthew L. Spitzer, Framing the Jury: Cognitive
Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REv. 1341, 1348 (1995); Frank B. Cross, In
Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 16 (2000).
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litigants into two mythical jurisdictions.94  In the traditional
jurisdiction subjects would not discover the outcome of the case if
they settled. In contrast, in the "regret jurisdiction," judges (acting
in the stead of juries) pronounced a judgment even if the parties
settled. The great majority of moot plaintiffs in the traditional
jurisdiction selected the sure payoff of a settlement because that
choice shielded them from learning of the result at trial-and the
prospect of experiencing ex post regret associated with a lesser
judgment by proceeding to a jury verdict. In the regret
jurisdiction, the certainty of settlement no longer protected the
litigants from the negative feedback of a trial and, as expected, a
much greater number proceeded to trial.9 ' Subjects were much
more likely to settle in the traditional jurisdiction, thus avoiding
the possible regret associated with receiving a lesser judgment at
trial. The outcome of the study contravened the prediction of both
the economic and framing models. 96 Because the settlement offers
equaled the expected value of an award at trial, the subjects should
not have pronounced a preference for settling or litigating to
trial.9' Yet, the study's participants expressed a strong desire to
settle when doing so shielded them from the possibility of learning
the judge's award at trial.9s These hypothetical litigants were regret
averse and acted to minimize post-decisional regret.9
The results of this study are also consistent with the behavior of
actual litigants.'00 Rachlinski's data indicates that 56% of the time
plaintiffs are worse off for going to trial.'0 ' In 78% of these cases
94. Guthrie, supra note 75, at 73-77. The study used two different tests: one designed
for plaintiffs and the other for defendants. In the plaintiffs' scenario, 81.5% of the subjects
in the traditional jurisdiction responded that the plaintiff would settle, while only 18.5%
settled in the regret jurisdiction where the litigants learned the damages the judge would
have awarded in the event of a trial. The scenario designed to test defendants' behavior
yielded similar results. In the traditional jurisdiction, where the feedback and potential re-
gret associated with trial can be avoided by settling, 79.2% of the subjects chose settlement,
while in the regret regime 20.8% opted to settle.
95. Id. at 75.
96. Id. at 75, 78. In the plaintiff model, the subjects chose between a settlement offer
of $2500 and an expected award at trial of $2500. In the defendant test, the subjects had a
choice between paying the plaintiff $2500 and an expected loss of $2500 if the case went to
trial.
97. Id. at 75.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 80.
100. Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 149. This Note focuses primarily on the data collected
between suits involving non-corporate entities as parties. However, its findings are consistent
with the numbers involving corporate plaintiffs and defendants whom Rachlinski argues are
risk neutral.
101. Id.at154.
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the plaintiffs received nothing at all and in the remainder the
plaintiff obtains less than the defendant's final settlement offer.
02
Plaintiffs improve on the defendant's final settlement offer only
23% of the time, yet in those few occasions they recover relatively
large jury awards. 10 3 Rachlinski argued that this data supports the
framing model because overall plaintiffs exhibit risk aversion while
defendants, on average, produce risk-seeking behavior. 14 He main-
tains that because the vast majority of plaintiffs settle, they are risk
averse because they forego the possibility of potentially large jury
verdicts. 105
However, regret theory better explains the litigation behavior
evaluated in this study. While plaintiffs as a class were $66,106
richer for litigating, the majority of those plaintiffs who brought
their suits to trial recovered nothing. Plaintiffs who choose to settle
are not necessarily risk averse because recovery at trial is predi-
cated, at least to some degree, on the relative strength of their
cases. Rather, litigants (in consultation with their attorneys) with
weak facts or problematic law realize that their chances of recover-
ing a large jury award are small. In contrast, plaintiffs with a strong
case will reject a defendant's low settlement offer because of the
higher expected return of a trial. The plaintiffs who settle cannot
overcome the regret premium associated with the failure to reach
an agreement prior to trial. Probabilistically, those plaintiffs who
seek a trial believe so strongly in their case that the prospect of a
large judgment trumps the anticipated regret involved with the
inability to settle-and juries reward them for this belief. The sta-
tistics indicate that plaintiffs are not necessarily risk averse, but
they are regret averse, unless the specific circumstances of the case
outweigh the regret the litigants experience when they refuse the
certainty of a settlement offer and elect to proceed to trial.
102. Id.
103. Id. The plaintiffs averaged a recovery of $9422 in cases where the judgment fell be-
low the defendant's final offer. In such cases, the plaintiffs could have settled for an average
of $37,109, a difference of $27,687. However, in suits where the recovery exceeded the de-
fendant's final settlement demand, plaintiffs average award was of $553,518. The plaintiff's
mean offer in such suits was $198,569, a difference of $354,949.
104. Id. at 159. Rachlinski maintains that the plaintiffs as a class were risk averse because
those that advanced their position by going to trial achieved a much better result than of-
fered by the defendant during settlement talks. On average plaintiffs who litigated earned
$66,106 (minus attorneys fees) for their efforts. Defendants as a class paid $81,638 per case
because of the high awards given to plaintiffs who recovered a greater amount than offered
in settlement negotiations.
105. Id.
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C. Insurance
Research concerning regret theory and the law has yet to exam-
ine the related areas of torts and insurance. These subjects are
particularly interesting because of their role in shaping early law
and economics. 1 6 They are a fertile ground for analysis under re-
gret theory because of the importance of acts versus omissions,
feedback and decisional agency.
As an example, consider a young parent contemplating the pur-
chase of life insurance. She must weigh the costs and benefits of
paying the monthly premiums, not against the probability that she
will die (we're fairly certain p=l), but against the chance she will
die at a time when her family will require compensation to pay off
the mortgage, college tuition and other expenses. Buying insur-
ance helps shelter her from ex post regret-but only up to a point.
The prospect of lying on one's deathbed, uninsured, with small
children needing care, could stir strong feelings of anticipated re-
gret. 0 7 However, once she buys the insurance and pays the
premium every month, and her kids grow up and no longer need
an insurance payment upon her death, she may very well feel re-
gret for purchasing insurance year after year. Yet, her behavior is
perfectly consistent with the predictions of regret theory. The ex-
pected utility of purchasing insurance, plus the anticipated regret
associated with the outcome of dying uninsured in the near future
provides sufficient "modified utility" to move from the status quo.
This is a completely rational choice even if she lives long enough to
"regret" it.
Insurance also acts as a delegation tool that lowers the level of
anticipated regret and facilitates action and a departure from the
status quo. If individuals favor the status quo due to fears of regret,
then people need an incentive to overcome the increased regret
premium associated with actions. Insurance facilitates this transac-
tion over and above the predictions of expected utility. Economic
analysis suggests an appropriate amount of insurance. Too little
will not cover an actor's expected level of care and too much is an
106. See Calabresi, supra note 14, at 518.
107. One does not actually have to experience regret for it to impact decision making.
If the mother dies suddenly in a car accident she will not have the opportunity for ex post
regret (we are sorely lacking in empirical data from heaven). What matters is that she factors
regret into her decision ex ante--when she thinks about lying on her deathbed uninsured.
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inefficient allocation of resources.'l " Regret theory alters this analy-
sis. What expected utility deems "over insurance" may actually
reflect the amount required to overcome the regret premium at-
tributed to action. 09
Regret theory also helps to explain the person who simultane-
ously gambles and buys insurance as protection against the
relatively small chance of a large loss."'l Take as an example the
prospective Michigan homeowner who wants to purchase earth-
quake insurance.'' For whatever the reason, he will not build his
house without it. At first glance this behavior appears idiosyncratic
and irrational. Even if this individual is grossly overestimating a low
probability risk, regret theory indicates that policy makers should
permit the market to provide the insurance."2 Buying the insur-
ance will allow an action that would not have occurred otherwise.
Thus, this "extra" insurance is far from inefficient; it promotes a
transaction that would not have been completed in its absence.
This example illustrates that regret theory is not a call for
paternalism on the part of policy makers. On the contrary, the
theory suggests that the state should not intervene. Allowing the
purchase of a facially idiosyncratic "safety blanket" helps
consummate transactions and allows goods or services to flow to the
highest valued user. Policy makers should exercise caution when
enacting consumer protection laws, particularly in the realm of
insurance. Rather than prohibiting the sale out of the fear the
insurance company will swindle the consumer, the purchase should
108. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Greenblatt, Comment, Insurance and Subrogation: Wen the Pie Is-
n't BigEnough, Who Eats Last?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (1997).
109. Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELLJ. ECON. 120, 121 (1982). In the
realm of liability or property insurance if one buys more coverage than required the pros-
pect of a "moral hazard" is created. This type of insurance is meant to indemnify against a
loss. If the amount of insurance is greater than the possible loss the individual has an incen-
tive to bring about the event against which he is insured. For example, if a home is valued at
$100,000, but a homeowner buys a fire insurance policy in the amount of $150,000, he has
an incentive to burn the house down to obtain the additional $50,000. However, if the cost
of anticipated regret is factored into the problem the amount of the regret premium that
must be overcome to participate in the activity should also be counted as part of the indem-
nification.
110. Loomes & Sugden, supra note 1, at 814.
111. The risk of an earthquake in Michigan is not precisely known, although the event is
extremely rare. The last substantial quake occurred near Kalamazoo in 1947. There were re-
ports of broken windows and cracked plaster. Earthquake Hazards Program, U.S. Geological
Survey, Largest Earthquake in Michigan (citing CARL W. STOVER & JERRY L. COFFMAN, SEIS-
MICITY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1568-1989 (REVISED) (U.S. Geological Survey Professional
Paper 1527, 1993), available at http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eqlists/USA/1947_08_10.html (last
modified Apr. 5,2001).
112. If the risk is truly low the homeowner's premiums will reflect the low probability
that the insurance company will ever have to make a payment on the policy.
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be permitted as a means of overcoming anticipated regret and
spurring action.
D. Tort Law: Rules and the Modification of Behavior
Law and economics seeks to influence behavior by providing in-
centives to individuals to select efficient choices." 3 Forcing
individuals to internalize the costs their actions impose on society
is an important means that law and economics employs to accom-
plish its prescriptive ends. Regret theory does not reject this basis
for influencing decision making, but seeks to refine it further.
Many legal economists have studied the risks surrounding the
contraction of AIDS under the rubric of expected utility.114 Ex-
pected utility predicts that a person calculates the costs and
benefits of unsafe sex. If the expected utility of safe sex is greater
than unsafe sex the person will use protection. 5 As a result, legal
economists point to AIDS policy as a weak case for legal interven-
tion because the risks are known and borne by the parties."1
6
Compare the predictions of prospect theory. An individual is likely
to be overoptimistic and discount his chances of acquiring the dis-
ease. This attitude toward risk does not indicate a careful weighing
of probabilities and thus strengthens a case for legal or policy-
oriented interventions.117
Unlike expected utility or prospect theory, regret theory does
not focus on the choices before the act (whether or not to wear a
condom) but on the outcomes of the choice-the contraction of
AIDS or remaining disease free. With the appropriate information
about the risks of the disease, regret theory predicts a higher level
of safe sex then expected utility or prospect theory. First, these two
outcomes are easily juxtaposed, thereby providing a good basis for
applying regret theory. Additionally, feedback is inevitable. At some
point down the road the individual will learn whether or not he
has AIDS. Encouraging HIV testing can speed up this process. If
113. POSNER, supra note 12, at 27.
114. Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997 WisC. L.
Rav 433, 443. This Note does not advocate or suggest that the transmission of HIV should
be considered a tort. However, the scenario described above is illustrative of many bilateral
interactions and serves as an example of how the teachings of regret theory may be utilized
to modify individual conduct.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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people feel compelled to take a test after unsafe sex then the best
way to shield themselves from this feedback is to wear a condom,
thus lessening the need for testing.
Decisional agency also alters the analysis in the AIDS problem. If
the individual takes responsibility for his own protection, then fail-
ing to do so comes with heightened levels of anticipated regret.
This may be avoided by delegating the decision to one's partner,
who may or may not have a different risk calculus (especially if he
suspects he is already HIV+). This is not necessarily a desirable
outcome and it suggests that the state should focus sex education
programs on having people assume decisional control (almost like
a norm) over their own safe sex practices. Psychologists in England
have experimented with this teaching technique with a great deal
of success."" These predictions are further strengthened if unsafe
sex is viewed as an act that is regretted more than the failure to use
a condom. Yet, this approach only works if safe sex is established as
the status quo for the individual. Failure to use a condom is thus
viewed as an action that induces higher levels of anticipated regret.
This type of analysis may be applied to simple cases of bilateral
precautions in negligence. In auto accidents, where ex ante it is un-
clear who will be the victim or the injurer, expected utility states
that negligence is the most effective way to induce both parties to
take care." 9 As a rational actor, a person will view himself in both
possible roles of injurer or victim. If he is the injurer, he will be li-
able under a negligence scheme if he fails to take all cost justified
precautions. As a result, because he seeks to maximize his expected
utility he takes all such precautions. 12 In the role of the victim, he
assumes that the prospective injurer is rational and has thus taken
all cost justified precautions. 2 ' Knowing this, he must also take all
cost justified precautions to prevent himself from becoming the
victim and bearing the costs of the accident. Such behavior results
in the economically efficient level of accidents and provides incen-
tives to take the appropriate level of care.
The behavioral law and economics critique of such analysis is
clear. Due to over optimism, people underestimate their chances of
getting in an accident and thus do not exercise the appropriate
118. Guthrie, supra note 75, at 71-72; Rene Richard et al., Anticipated Regret and Time
Perspective: Changing Sexual Risk-Taking Behavior, 9 J. OF BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 185, 196
(1996); van der Pligt & Richard, supra note 75, at 192.
119. Ulen, supra note 114, at 445.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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level of care.1 2  Additionally, prospect theory predicts that if people
view an accident as a loss they may actually be risk seeking and
purchase less insurance or drive more recklessly.
2
1
Regret theory does not necessarily predict what level of care
people will take, but rather that the anticipation of regret will alter
the expected utility risk calculus. By choosing to exercise care a
driver helps to shield himself from the prospect of a regret-
inducing accident. Additionally, these bilateral scenarios provide
easily comparable "states of the world"-the status quo versus the
accident-occurring outcome. Feedback is strongest in the world
where the accident occurs. Thus, the person can better avoid this
dissonant information with a higher level of care. The decision on
how much care to take rests squarely with the driver, and he feels
more regret than if he could delegate the choice. Thus, regret the-
ory predicts a greater level of care than anticipated by the purely
monetary incentives of expected utility.
124
As discussed above, framing outcomes alters the level of antici-
pated regret, which in turn, changes an actor's risk calculus. 25 For
example, if a driver is presented with information in a context so it
appears that people in his position have a lower risk of accidents,
then his regret premium is more easily overcome, resulting in less
than due care on the roads.
Conversely, enhancing the level of anticipated regret can in-
crease one's affinity for the status quo and promote inaction when
it is socially desirable to do so. While expected utility operates by
raising or lowering costs to the individual, regret theory suggests
monetary incentives can be supplemented by emotions to influ-
ence behavior.2 6 Since regret theory is centered on two or more
outcomes rather than prospects, framing the outcomes alters be-
havior. The crystallization of outcomes thus raises the regret
premium ex ante and discourages action.
122. Sunstein, supra note 30, at 4.
123. See supra note 25, and accompanying text.
124. How much more care is unclear. Alternatively, a driver may not compare outcomes
because he is overoptimistic about his chances of avoiding an accident. This would lower his
anticipated regret and he would take less care than predicted by expected utility. More re-
search is needed in this area to determine how individuals view driving and other bilateral
scenarios.
125. Harless, supra note 64, at 647.
126. Peter Huang, Reasons within Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights Bar-
gaining, 79 OR. L. REV. 435, 448 (2000).
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PART -- CONCLUSION
This Note introduces regret theory as an alternative explanation
of rationality. Regret theory assumes people either rejoice or ex-
perience regret after making a decision and that they anticipate
these feelings ex ante. Studies have shown that regret looms larger
than rejoicing and serves to lower the expected utility of a deci-
sion, thus creating a modified utility. Action is regretted more than
inaction and the prospect of feedback increases the level of antici-
pated regret. People also tend to regret decisions more when they
make a choice themselves. The ease of comparison and cognitive
biases, such as framing, play a significant role in shaping the level
of anticipated regret as well. All of these factors influence regret
theory's relationship to the law.
12 7
In contracts, regret predicts an actor's desire to defer to stan-
dard terms and it forecasts certain litigants' preferences of
settlement over trial. In torts, regret predicts a different standard
of care than observed under expected utility. In this respect, regret
theory highlights various weaknesses of expected utility. The theory
postulates that insurance may act as a catalyst, allowing individuals
to delegate a decision, thus lowering the level of anticipated regret
and facilitating action. It helps to explain why people purchase in-
surance and advocates for the presentation of information in a
manner that, whether to encourage safe sex or careful driving, es-
tablishes the desired outcome as the status quo. The individual
must overcome the regret associated with departing from this base-
line. This tactic can encourage caution in high-risk situations and
provide incentives for alternative behavior. While not a replace-
ment for economic analysis, the theory promises to add depth and
subtlety to our current understanding of the role of expected util-
ity theory in the law.
127. Regret theory is relevant to significant areas of the law not discussed in this Note.
See Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1977). In his article,
Professor Lempert discusses the relationship between evidentiary rules and the hypothetical
regret matrix constructed by a criminal jury. He argues that each piece of evidence alters the
regret a juror anticipates with either convicting or acquitting the defendant. In particular,
he describes how prejudicial evidence, such as past convictions or character evidence alters
ex antejuror regret and, depending on the nature of the evidence, sways the jury towards or
away from conviction. Lempert asserts that many of the federal rules of evidence are de-
signed to limit evidence that substantially alters ajuror's anticipated regret without logically
relating to the legal questions the jury must answer.
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